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ERISA REMEDIES, WELFARE BENEFITS, AND

BAD FAITH: LOSING SIGHT OF THE
CATHEDRAL
Peter K. Stris*

After many years of study and debate, Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974' ("ERISA").
Although born from concerns about pension security, 2 ERISA governs
both pension and welfare plans.3 ERISA defines a "pension plan" to
include "any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an
employer" that "provides retirement income"A or "results in a deferral of
income by employees." 5 Its importance in protecting the retirement
security of Americans can hardly be overstated.6
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania; Principal, Stris & Maher LLP. This Article was presented as part of the March 13,
2009 Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal Symposium, The Grand Irony of ERISA?:
Intersectionality of ERISA Preemption and Remedial Issues. It is influenced by my experiences
arguing two recent ERISA cases before the United States Supreme Court: LaRue v. DeWolff,
Boberg, & Associates, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008) and Sereboff et ux. v. Mid-Atlantic Medical
Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006). I am grateful for the generous assistance that I received from
many including Jean Claude Andre, Roger Baron, Paul Bland, Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, John
Bronsteen, Debra Davis, William A. Delgado, Maura Dundon, Shay Dvoretzky, James Feldman,
Daniel Feinberg, Thomas C. Goldstein, Julia M. Graff, Deepak Gupta, Karen Handorf, Elizabeth
Hopkins, Robert Hoskins, Todd Jackson, Alison LaCroix, Bill Lann Lee, Paul Alan Levy, Jeffrey
Lewis, Brendan S. Maher, Shaun P. Martin, Paul A. Montuori, Lindsay Nako, Scott L. Nelson,
Radha A. Pathak, Teresa Reneker, Matthew D. Roberts, Paul M. Secunda, Mary Ellen Signorille,
John C. Stein, Jay Sushelsky, Christopher Trower, Nina Wasow, and Kathryn Zeiler. And I thank
Madelaine Behr, Daniel Leonetti, and Molly O'Brien for their invaluable research assistance.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
2. In the words of a fellow Symposium participant, "ERISA was Congress's attempt to
devise a comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of American workers who looked to
private pension plans for financial support in their retirement years." JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, A POLITICAL HISTORY 1 (2004).

3. ERISA § 3(3) ("The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.").
4. Id. § 3(2)(A)(i).
5. Id. § 3(2)(A)(ii).
6. ERISA-govemed "retirement plans are the single largest source of income [other than
Social Security] for aged Americans." WOOTEN, supra note 2, at 1-2 (citations omitted). As of
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ERISA defines a "welfare plan" to include "any plan, fund, or
program ... established or maintained by an employer" that provides
"medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment.",7 As of 2002,
these welfare plans covered 137 million workers, retirees, and their
families. 8 The statute has extraordinary influence on the delivery of
healthcare 9 and other non-retirement benefits such as disability
insurance, life insurance, and severance pay. 10
Notable commentators have long expressed the concern about
ERISA that is the subject of this Symposium. In her 2004 concurrence
in Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila,1" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described
that concern as follows:

2003, "[a]bout fifty million private-sector employees, including a majority of year-round, full-time
workers, participate[d] in a retirement plan regulated by ERISA." Id. at 2 (citations omitted). And
as of the end of 2006, these retirement plans held more than $5.5 trillion in assets. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow of FundAccounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings, 113
(June 7, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20070607/z.pdf.
7. ERISA § 3(1).
8. See Brief of the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Qualchoice's Petition for
En Banc Rehearing at 13, Qualehoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-3614).
9. The majority of private health insurance in the United States is provided through ERISAgoverned welfare plans. In 2006, for example, non-elderly Americans received health insurance
from the following sources: 62% (162.7 million people) from an employer; 18% (46.5 million
people) had no insurance; 15% (39.1 million people) from public programs, and 5% (12.5 million
people) from some other source. See SARA R. COLLINS, CHAPIN WHITE & JENNIFER L. KRIss,
WHITHER EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE? THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF U.S.
COMPANIES IN THE PROVISION AND FINANCING OF HEALTH INSURANCE, THE COMMONWEALTH

FUND
7,
fig. I
(Sept.
17,
2007)
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2007/Sep/WhitherEmployer-Based-Health-Insurance--The-Current-and-Future-Role-of-U-S--Companies-in-theProvis.aspx. This is particularly significant because most healthcare expenditures in America are
made by those with private insurance. See, e.g., GARY OLIN, MEDICAL EXPENDITURES OF THE
NON-ELDERLY BY AGE AND INSURANCE STATUS,

2004 (Jan. 2008), http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/

mepsweb/data.files/publications/st197/statl97.pdf (noting that 79% of all medical expenditures
were made by those with private health insurance in 2004).
10. For example, "[sihort- and long-term disability benefits were available [in 2004] to 39 and
30 percent of workers, respectively, and nearly all participated." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR

STATISTICS,

NATIONAL

COMPENSATION

SURVEY:

EMPLOYEE

BENEFITS

IN PRIVATE

2004 1 (Nov. 2004) available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsmOO02.pdf. See also Letter from Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Associate
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues for the United States General
Accounting Office, to the Honorable Robert E. Andrews, Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations Committee on Education and the Workforce of the
United States House of Representatives (Nov. 5, 1999), http://archive.gao.gov/pdf/163015.pdf
(noting that, according to 1996-97 data, approximately 36% and 26% of all employees in the private
sector had short- and long-term disability insurance, respectively).
11. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
INDUSTRY

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES,

MARCH
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Because the [Supreme] Court has coupled an encompassing
interpretation of ERISA's preemptive force with a cramped
construction of the... relief[ ] allowable under [ERISA], a "regulatory
vacuum" exists: "[V]irtually all state law remedies
are preempted but
2
very few federal substitutes are provided."'

As such, Justice Ginsburg joined what another noted jurist had
described as "the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress
... revisit
13
what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime."'
It is easy to appreciate the concern articulated by Justice Ginsburg
and others. 14 When a statutory violation has been committed, we expect
that those injured by the violation will have an appropriate remedy. 15 At
the same time, however, reasonable minds often differ in their

12. Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d
442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
13. Id. (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (Becker, J., concurring)). See also Cicio v. Does,
321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting), rehearing after remand, 385 F.3d 156
(2d Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhe injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be healed until the
Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress
revisits the law to the same end."); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.
Mass. 1997) ("This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for Congress to
amend ERISA . . . [which] has evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers,
utilization review providers, and other managed care entities from potential liability for the
consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.") (footnote omitted); Kathyrn J. Kennedy,
Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1083, 1091 (2001)
("Although the intent of the preemption clause was to provide uniformity regarding the
administration of plan benefits, it is now being used as a shield for plan fiduciaries and insurers to
limit their liability under these plans. Such a result is inconsistent with ERISA's overall objective to
protect participants' rights.") (footnote omitted).
14. A now-infamous memorandum written by a disability insurance executive almost fifteen
years ago is often cited to illustrate the importance of that concern. The memorandum, which was
produced during the course of litigation, observed that:
[t]he advantages of ERISA [to a litigation defendant] are enormous: state law is
preempted by federal law, there are no jury trials, there are no compensatory or punitive
damages, relief is usually limited to the amount of benefit in question, and claims
administrators may receive a deferential standard of review. The economic impact...
from having policies covered by ERISA could be significant. As an example, [we]
identified 12 claim situations where we settled for $7.8 million in the aggregate. If these
12 cases had been covered by ERISA, our liability would have been between zero and
$0.5 million.
Memorandum from Jeff McCall to IDC Mgmt. Group & Glenn Felton (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.erisa-claims.comlibrary/Provident%20memo.pdf.
15. This expectation was specifically expressed by Congress when it described ERISA as
"providing for appropriateremedies." Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (emphasis added). And the civil enforcement provisions of
the statute themselves use the word "appropriate" several times. See id.; ERISA § 409(a)
("equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate"); ERISA § 502(a)(2) ("appropriate
relief"); id. § 502(a)(3) ("appropriate equitable relief').
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6

conception of what remedies are appropriate.
The debate over what civil remedies should be available under
ERISA has long captured the attention of commentators 17 and the
courts.1 8 This Article addresses one of the most hotly contested

questions in that debate: what remedies should be available in litigation
against a welfare plan and its fiduciaries when a litigant has been injured
by the wrongful handling of her benefits claim? It has a modest goal: to

illustrate that the conflict that has raged over this question is nothing
more than an age-old consequentialist battle over liability rules which,
for several often misunderstood reasons, is not amenable to simplistic
legislative or judicial resolution.

9

By ignoring this reality and failing to

reach a thoughtful compromise, we ensure that an important body of
liability rules will continue to develop by default rather than by design.
I.

EXISTING REMEDIES

As explained above, employer-sponsored
regulated by ERISA.20

welfare plans are

Although several different types of employee

16. For example, those who disagree with the viewpoint espoused by Justice Ginsburg believe
that market pressures coupled with existing legal rules already provide sufficient protections to
participants and beneficiaries. See CAROLE ROAN GRESENZ ET AL., A FLOOD OF LITIGATION?
PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING

LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ERISA

BENEFICIARIES, 2, tab. 1 (1999), http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_ papers/2006/IPI 84.pdf (table I:
column entitled "opponents of changing remedies"); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200, 222-24 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. concurring). They also believe that "[i]ncreased exposure [under
ERISA] will result in defensive practices [that, in turn] will result in large increases in health care
costs [that, in turn] will result in higher premiums [and] reductions in employer-sponsored insurance
coverage." GRESENZ, supra, at 2 tab. I.
17. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321 (2003)
("examining the purposes and main features of ERISA ... [and] then tum[ing] to the three Supreme
Court decisions that have contorted ERISA remedy law."). See also Colleen E. Medill, Resolving
the Judicial Paradox of "Equitable" Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 827, 831 (2006) ("develop[ing] a statutory and policy-based theory"); Dana M. Muir, ERISA
Remedies: Chimera or CongressionalCompromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. I, 3 (1995) ("concentrat[ing]
on the scope of relief available in ERISA fiduciary and Section 510 claims after Mertens.").
18. For example, the United States Supreme Court has decided several statutory interpretation
cases involving the precise scope of ERISA section 502(a). See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, &
Assocs., Inc. 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008) (interpreting section 502(a)(2) of ERISA); Sereboff v.
Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361-63 (2006) (interpreting section 502(a)(3)); GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220-21 (2002) (interpreting section
502(a)(3)); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260-63 (1993) (interpreting section 502(a)(3));
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (interpreting section 502(a)(2)).
19. Throughout this Article, I use the term "liability rules" to encompass the rules governing
what civil remedies are available to an aggrieved litigant.
20. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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benefits may be provided by such plans, 2' most welfare benefits take the
form of insurance.22 In other words, an employee who chooses to
participate in her employer's welfare plan23 is promised something of
value (e.g., medical care, a monetary payment) if and when a contingent

21. The term "employee benefit" is commonly used to describe any non-wage compensation
provided by an employer to an employee. This conception of employee benefits (i.e., as deferred
compensation) has long been advanced by some economists. See, e.g., Albert de Roode, Pensions
as Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 287 (1913) ("A pension system ... is really paid by the
employee, not perhaps in money, but in the foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain
except for the establishment of a pension system."). Its adoption by American courts, however, is
comparatively recent. See Peter M. Rehon, The Pension Expectation as ConstitutionalProperty,8
HAST[NGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 168 (1980) ("[M]ost courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries viewed noncontributory private pensions plans as mere gratuities."). See generally A.
Norman Somers & Louis Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gratuitiesor Compensation?, 4
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 77 (1950). Even today, there is disagreement regarding the extent to
which employee benefits are truly deferred compensation rather than "status benefits." This
disagreement animates the debate over whether, and under what circumstances, an employee-benefit
that ERISA permits to be "non-vested" (e.g., retiree healthcare benefits) may be terminated.
Although the issue is quite important, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
22. Insurance is simply a form of risk management used to hedge against the risk of a
contingent loss. Typically, a consumer (i.e., the insured) directly enters into a contract with another
party (i.e., the insurer). Pursuant to the contract, the insured pays a fixed sum (the premium). In
exchange for this premium payment, the insurer assumes the financial risk of a contractually defined
peril for an agreed period of time. A peril is any risk the likelihood of which can be quantified. In
the case of employer-sponsored insurance benefits, an employer may enter into a contract with an
insurance company on behalf of its employees and/or their beneficiaries (i.e., spouses, dependents).
Alternatively, it may self-insure by agreeing to pay covered benefits once they are earned (either out
of a segregated fund or out of the company's general accounts). If an employer chooses to selfinsure, it may nonetheless purchase what is commonly referred to as "stop-loss insurance" which
pays the employer for costs incurred above an agreed upon level. As commentators have long
noted, the decision to self-insure--either fully or with the purchase of stop-loss insurance-is often
influenced by ERISA. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or
"One Good Loophole Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89, 110-12 (2005)
(defending employers' decisions to avoid state-level regulation by purchasing stop-loss insurance
but arguing that state regulators can exploit the "savings clause loophole" by directly regulating
stop-loss insurance companies); see also Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and
ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 235-36 (1997)
(arguing that ERISA should not be construed to preempt states from enforcing insurance laws
against a stop-loss plan's insurer); L. Darnell Weeden, Tactical Self-Funded ERISA Employers
Unnecessarily Threaten Employees' Right to an Independent Review of an HMO's Medical
Necessity Determination with Preemption, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 867, 884 (2003) (arguing that
ERISA preemption jurisprudence "may lead some employers to change to unfunded employee
benefit plans to avoid ERISA's insurance saving clause").
23. ERISA refers to such an individual as a "participant" and defines that term to include "any
employee or former employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type
from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer." Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 402(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2006). A welfare plan
may also promise benefits to the "beneficiary" of a participant. ERISA defines a "beneficiary" as "a
person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. § 402(8).
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event should occur (e.g., sickness, disability, death).24
Each year, there are millions of recorded disputes regarding the
scope of coverage under employer-sponsored insurance arrangements.2 5
Typical disputes involve questions such as the following: 26 Is a
particular medical treatment experimental and, therefore, not covered by
the plan? 27 Is a particular treatment medically necessary? 28 Is an
individual disqualified from receiving a particular medical or disability
benefit because her illness is the result of a pre-existing medical
condition? 29 Does an individual satisfy her plan's definition of
disabled?3 °

24. There are three important perils that are commonly covered by employer-sponsored
insurance: illness (health insurance), debilitating injuries (disability insurance), and death (life
insurance). An enormous portion of insurance against such perils in the United States today is
currently provided by employer-sponsored welfare plans. See supra notes 9 and 10.
25. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008) (noting that
approximately "1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA plans have health care claims denied each year")
(citing GRESENZ, supra note 16, at 8). This statistic only includes healthcare benefit denials. It
does not include denials of claims for disability benefits, life insurance benefits, and other welfare
benefits.
26. The existence and magnitude of such disputes is neither surprising nor temporary. This is
true for three reasons: First, any system that insures well over 100 million Americans against a
broad range of perils will necessarily result in many disagreements regarding the scope of coverage.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption,and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 625 (2001). Second, welfare insurance benefits are typically defined in subjective terms. For
example, most health insurance benefits are defined in terms of "medical necessity." Conventional
wisdom is that "contractual precision [in defining health insurance benefits] has not occurred
because . . . [t]he coverage decision-making enterprise is fundamentally resistant to ex ante
elaboration." David M. Studdert et al., Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact on
Employer Coverage?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 7, 18 (1999). And, third, there is an inherent conflict
between the financial interests of the benefit decision-maker and the benefit applicant in virtually
every coverage dispute involving welfare insurance benefits. See generally John Bronsteen,
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the
United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008).
27. See JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 542 (2d ed. 2005)
("Medical plans typically exclude experimental and investigational treatments. There has been a
significant amount of litigation regarding treatments that insurers have characterized as
experimental and therefore not reimbursable.").
28. See id. at 544 ("Many cases involving medical benefit denials concern the issue of
whether a treatment is medically necessary."). See also William M. Sage, Managed Care'sCrimea:
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 599 (2003) ("explor[ing] the concept of medical necessity as it has
evolved in the judicial and administrative oversight of managed care.").
29. See ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 27, at 545 ("Because many medical plans contain
some exclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions, the question of whether a particular medical
condition arose before the coverage under the plan is one that is litigated with some frequency.").
30. See id. at 554 ("Courts have frequently addressed the question of whether a particular
condition qualifies as a disability entitling a participant to receive benefits under a plan.").
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If a claim for benefits is denied, ERISA requires that the plan
"provide adequate notice in writing ... setting forth the specific reasons
for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
participant., 31 The statute also mandates that the plan "afford a
reasonable opportunity . . . for a full and fair review
by the appropriate
32
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.,
In addition to mandating administrative review, however, ERISA
also permits civil litigation to redress violations.33 In this regard, the
relevant part of the statute is section 502(a).34 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, it sets forth the exclusive remedies that are available to a
civil litigant.35 Although section 502(a) currently has several parts,
"[s]ubsections (1)-(3) . . . constitute the three remedy provisions upon
which virtually all claims by ERISA participants and beneficiaries are
brought., 36 Only sections 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) are significant in the
welfare plan setting.3 7
Disputes over benefits are squarely addressed by section
502(a)(1)(B) which authorizes a participant or beneficiary to file a civil
action to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
'
future benefits under the terms of the plan. 38
Because of the nature of

31. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 503(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1133(1) (2006). As contemplated by this section of the statute, the Department of Labor has
promulgated regulations setting forth many procedural requirements for administrative review of
denied claims. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2009).
32. ERISA § 503(2).
33. See ERISA § 502(a) (entitled "Civil enforcement"). See also ERISA § 2(b) (entitled
"Congressional findings and declaration of policy" and providing that "[i]t is hereby declared to be
the policy of this chapter to protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries ... by providing for . . . ready access to the Federal courts."); Pilot Life Ins. Co.

v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) ("The civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one of the
essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of ERISA.").
34. ERISA § 502(a).
35. See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 ("The deliberate care with which ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were drafted . . . argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive."); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 146 (1985) ("The ... carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)
of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.").
36. Langbein, supra note 17, at 1334 (footnotes omitted).
37. Section 502(a)(2) permits litigation against a breaching plan fiduciary in order to recover
plan losses or disgorge fiduciary gains. ERISA § 502(a)(2). In either event, the lawsuit must be
brought on behalf of the plan. Section 502(a)(2) can apply in litigation involving the handling of
welfare benefits but only if the plan is funded and the dispute involves the mismanagement of its
assets.
38. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Two technical points about section 502(a)(1)(B) are worth
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welfare insurance benefits, however, the denial or delay in the provision
of such benefits often leads to non-economic injuries (i.e., pain and
suffering) and extra-contractual economic injuries (i.e., lost wages due to
a worsened medical condition). But section 502(a)(1)(B) merely allows
"the successful plaintiff [to obtain] an order directing the plan to provide
the benefits in dispute, plus attorneys' fees or, if the employee has paid
for the covered benefits out of his own pocket, he can obtain
reimbursement." 39 In other words, "consequential damages are not
allowed.

,4

Section 502(a)(3) authorizes participants and beneficiaries, inter
alia, to bring a civil action "to obtain ...appropriate equitable relief" to
enforce any provisions of the statute or to redress violations of the
statute or the terms of the ERISA plan at issue. 4' As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, this statutory provision has proven to be of little help to
victims of improper benefits handling.4 2 Although litigation continues
mentioning: First, "those that may be held liable in an action seeking recovery of benefits under
Section 502(a)(l)(B) include not only the plan but also its administrators and trustees." ZANGLEIN
& STABILE, supra note 27, at 536 (citing Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir 1998)).
Second, a lawsuit to recover benefits pursuant to section 502(a)(l)(B), unlike other civil litigation
authorized by ERISA, may be filed in either federal or state court. See ERISA § 502(e)(1) ("Except
for actions under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction ....
").Of course, only a small fraction of benefit denials actually result
in litigation in any court. See, e.g., Susan M. Mangiero, ERISA FiduciariesBeware: Risk Is More
Than a Four-Letter Word, 19 PROB. & PROP. 65, 65 (2005) ("According to the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, new [ERISA] cases [numbered] 9,167 ...in 2000 [and] 11,499 . . . in
2004.").
39. Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 632 (footnote omitted); see also ERISA § 502(g)(1)
(authorizing "the court in its discretion [to] allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action" in
various circumstances including litigation under section 502(a)(1)(B)).
40. Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 632; see also Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an
Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 436
(2000) ("Without exception, the benefits enforcement section has been construed to permit only the
recovery of benefits due under a plan.") (footnote and citations omitted).
41. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B).
42. The Court first addressed the meaning of section 502(a)(3) in Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.,
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
In Mertens, the beneficiaries of an ERISA plan sought monetary
compensation from a third party who allegedly participated in the plan fiduciaries' breach. Id. at
250-51. Although "[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief," id. at 255, the
beneficiaries-joined by the United States as amicus curiae-argued that they sought "equitable
relief' under section 502(a)(3) because, "at common law, the courts of equity had exclusive
jurisdiction over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust." Id. at 256 (citations
omitted). Put simply, the government argued that participants and beneficiaries were entitled to
seek compensatory damages under the statute. A deeply divided Court rejected the argument. Id. at
257 ("Since all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained from a court of equity, limiting
the sort of relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to 'equitable relief in the sense of 'whatever relief a
common-law court of equity could provide in such a case' would limit the relief not at all.").
Instead, the Court held that the phrase "equitable relief' was intended by Congress to limit the
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over the precise meaning of "equitable relief' in this provision of
ERISA, the Supreme Court has continuously interpreted the phrase in a
manner which does not permit the recovery of extra-contractual or
punitive damages by participants or beneficiaries who are injured by
wrongful coverage determinations.43
The fact that consequential and punitive damages are not available
to a litigant under ERISA means that they are not available at all. Any
state law cause of action permitting a litigant to challenge a benefit
determination made by an ERISA plan is expressly preempted by section
514(a) of the statute. 44 And, even if a state law cause of action somehow
managed to survive preemption under section 5 14,4 it would be deemed
preempted by section 502(a) if it permitted consequential or punitive
damages.46 For this reason, many welfare plan participants and
beneficiaries who suffer serious or fatal injuries allegedly caused by the
wrongful handling of a benefits claim have been left with no meaningful
judicial remedy.47
remedies available under section 502(a)(3) to "those categories of relief that were typically available
in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." Id. at
256.
43. It is now clear that the list of remedies set forth in Mertens was intended to be illustrative,
not exhaustive. See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 356 (2006)
(recognizing the remedy of equitable lien by contractual agreement as "typically available in
equity"). To date, however, the Court has failed to accept the characterization of any remedy as
equitable that could be used by participants or beneficiaries to recover monetary compensation for
consequential injuries caused by the improper denial or delayed provision of welfare benefits.
44. See ERISA § 514(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan... ").See also Epstein & Sykes,
supra note 26, at 631 ("All courts seem to agree that disputes over the coverage of an employee
benefit plan relate to the administration of the plan and thus come within ERISA's general
preemption clause.").
45. This could happen either because the law at issue was somehow deemed not to "relate to"
an employee benefits plan or because it qualified for an exception in section 514(b) of ERISA
which saves from preemption "any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities." ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A).
46. As Professors Epstein and Sykes explain, "state law is preempted unless it is part of the
state law 'regulating insurance.' Even then, it will be preempted to the extent that it purports to
provide any 'remedy' for the denial of benefits (as distinguished from, say, a rule of insurance
contract construction)." Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 631-32. "The practical consequence of
this convoluted structure is that a civil enforcement action under ERISA is presently the sole legal
remedy available to a patient who challenges the denial of coverage by an MCO [managed care
organization] under a plan covered by ERISA." Id. at 632.
47. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
no remedy for death allegedly caused by delayed authorization for bone marrow transplant); Turner
v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D. Mass. 1997), aff'd, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st
Cir. 1997) (finding no remedy for death allegedly resulting from the denial of a bone marrow
transplant); Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1277 (10th Cir. 1996)
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II. THE DEBATE OVER LIABILITY RULES
Even critics of expansive judicial remedies admit that "[i]t is not
difficult to fashion an argument that this current ERISA remedy [for
wrongful denial of coverage] is inadequate. 48 In the commonly used
language of law and economics, the argument is simply that current
liability rules do not provide sufficient incentives for welfare plans to
internalize the negative externalities of wrongfully handling benefits
claims. 49 The argument is predicated on the uncontroversial notion that
a self-serving or careless welfare plan is better off financially whenever
it denies or delays coverage if the amount of money immediately saved
by failing to pay the insurance benefit is greater than the expected
present value of (i) the amount of money the plan will be required to
ultimately pay the claimant plus (ii) any additional expenditures that the
plan will likely incur as a result of the denial or delay (e.g., legal fees, an
award of fees to the claimant's attorney) plus (iii) the reputational cost of
the wrongful denial.5 °
Proponents of expanding liability in cases of wrongful benefits
handling maintain that there are compelling reasons to believe that
ERISA has created incentives that cannot possibly maximize the overall
welfare of players in the system. 51 First, they claim that many victims of

(finding no remedy for death allegedly caused by delayed authorization for treatment); Tolton v.
Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no remedy for suicide allegedly
resulting from refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
II F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no remedy for death allegedly caused by withdrawn
authorization for surgery); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 305 (8th Cir.
1993) (finding no remedy for death allegedly resulting from delayed authorization for surgery);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no remedy for
wrongful death of unborn child allegedly caused by denial of authorization for hospitalization).
48. Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 641.
49. The mitigation of negative externalities has long been recognized as an essential objective
in setting liability rules. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12
(1972). As recognized by Professor/Judge Calabresi and Professor Melamed's reference to Claude
Monet's paintings of the Rouen Cathedral, one need not analyze liability rules from a
consequentialist perspective. But there are few, if any, advocates of expanding ERISA remedies
who are approaching the debate from a non-consequentialist perspective. To be sure, proponents of
expanding remedies often make their initial arguments on different terms. But when opponents
respond with consequentialist arguments, virtually all proponents accept the consequentialist
framework and engage the debate as such.
50. Of course, it is also predicated on the notion that expanding the remedies available to civil
litigants will affect the behavior of welfare plans and their fiduciaries. See. e.g., GRESENZ, supra
note 16, at 4 ("Advocates of expanding liability [under ERISA] implicitly assume that private
litigation is an effective deterrent mechanism.").
51. As a fellow Symposium participant has noted, the Fifth Circuit articulated this position in
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wrongful coverage decisions currently do not have the financial

incentive to pursue legitimate claims to the point of settlement or
judgment.5 2 The availability of more robust remedies, the argument
goes, would result in a greater number of these claims proceeding to
resolution.53 Second, they argue that many victims of wrongful benefits
handling currently accept a less costly benefit than the one that they
initially requested. 54

The availability of more robust remedies, the

argument goes, would result in a greater number of these claims being
settled for fair (or close to fair) value. Finally, proponents of expanding
liability suggest that courts get some cases wrong (i.e., affirm improper
denials or delays) and that this is a particularly significant risk under the
current system because ERISA has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to require judicial deference to the administrative decisions of

welfare plan fiduciaries. 5 Stronger remedies, the argument goes, are a
means to discourage welfare plan fiduciaries from engaging in strategic
play in questionable cases.
Opponents of substantial expansion of liability maintain that there
are compelling reasons to believe that such expansion will actually

a well known ERISA case when it stated that "bad medical judgments will end up being cost-free to
the plans that rely on [utilization review] companies to contain medical costs" because, under
ERISA, "the cost of compliance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of prevention or
the cost of paying judgments) need not be factored in utilization review companies' cost of doing
business." Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA,
61 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manuscript at 33, on file with author) (quoting
Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992)).
52. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An
Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1068 (1996)
(noting that patients often "find it too expensive or too difficult to pursue their objections through
the costly and time-consuming judicial process").
53. This is true because the potential for a greater ultimate recovery will have two likely
effects: First, it will cause some victims of wrongful coverage determinations to bring lawsuits who
otherwise would have avoided the litigation process entirely. Second, it will cause other victims of
wrongful coverage determinations to continue the litigation of their claims until settlement or
judgment who otherwise would have dismissed their claims prior to resolution. In either case, this
might occur because the prospect of a greater ultimate recovery will influence whether-and to
what extent-attomeys are willing to bear the costs of such litigation (e.g., by accepting
contingency-fee compensation and/or by advancing costs).
54. As Professors Epstein and Sykes concede, "the calculus may be even more favorable
toward wrongful denial if the plan anticipates that it can settle the cases that are brought quickly
with minimal expenditures necessary to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys." Epstein & Sykes, supra
note 26, at 641. In this regard, it is worth nothing that settlements for less than 100% of the earned
insurance benefit not only save the plan money, but also permit advertisement of a high rate of
"coverage" because the patient does, ultimately, receive some treatment.
55. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and
JudicialReview of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REv. 1315, 1321 (2007).
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reduce overall welfare.5 6 To be sure, they concede that the availability
of extra-contractual damages "may be beneficial in theory, 57 but caution
that "[i]f the standards applied in the courts for finding [a violation] are
too lax and/or if damage awards are too high relative to the actual costs
incurred by [those] whose claims have been denied, substantial incentive
distortions may arise. 58 Three potential distortions, in particular, are
regularly identified: First, there is a concern that providing excessive
remedies will incent participants and beneficiaries to file illegitimate or
questionable claims. 59 Second, there is a concern that providing
excessive remedies will incent plans to settle (rather than investigate
and, in appropriate cases, dispute) illegitimate or questionable claims.6 °
Finally, there is a concern that providing excessive remedies will result
in the "over-invest[ment] in claims processing bureaucracy, procedures,

56. As a preliminary matter, they suggest that reputational costs already present a substantial
barrier to widespread misconduct and negligence in the coverage decision-making process. See,
e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 642 (asserting that "the usual market constraints associated
with repeat dealing and reputation are operative to a significant degree" and maintaining that "the
notion that ERISA-covered plans can deny benefits willy-nilly without significant penalty is plainly
exaggerated."). Of course, the extent to which market forces affect the behavior of welfare plan
fiduciaries is an empirical question. There is certainly evidence that market forces deter wrongful
coverage decisions. See, e.g., Dahlia K. Remler et al., What Do Managed Care PlansDo to Affect
Care? Results from a Survey of Physicians, 34 INQUIRY 196, 200 (1997) (finding that few
physician-recommended services are ultimately denied by managed care organizations). At the
same time, there is much evidence to suggest that market forces are woefully insufficient. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Mass. Office of Consumer Affairs & Bus. Regulation, Landmark Multi-State
Settlement in Effect Nat'l Remedy Grants Claims Review for Thousands (Dec. 21, 2004), available
at http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=ocaterminal&L=6&L0=Home&L 1=Govemment&L2=Our+Agen
cies+and+Divisions&L3=Division+of+insurance&L4=Archive+of+DO+News+%26+Updates&L5 =
=2004+DO1+ Press+Releases&sid=Eoca&b-terminalcontent& f-doi_Media_media.press59&csid
Eoca (describing a landmark agreement in which the largest disability insurer in the U.S. agreed
(i) to pay a $145 million settlement, (ii) to pay a $15 million penalty, and (iii) to reexamine more
than 200,000 disability benefit claims). At the end of the day, it is undeniable that one's world view
unquestionably colors his or her perspective regarding the extent to which reputational costs deter
wrongful conduct. Compare Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 642, with Bronsteen, Maher, &
Stris, supranote 26, at 2312 n.58.
57. Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, First-PartyInsurance Bad Faith Liability: Law,
Theory, and Economic Consequences, NAT'L ASS'N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, Sept 2008, at 7,
availableat www.namic.org/insbriefs/080926BadFaith.pdf.
58. Id.
59. "If damage awards are sufficient to create a 'windfall' for the insured, this may encourage
insureds to file illegitimate claims." ld. at 14. See also Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 642
("Given the diversity of medical opinions on the proper course of treatment for particular patients, it
may not be difficult for a plaintiff to find an expert willing to opine that some treatment was
necessary or nonexperimental.").
60. "Excessive damage awards will in addition discourage insurers from questioning claims
that may be potentially illegitimate." Tennyson & Warfel, supra note 57, at 14. Cf KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 178 (1986).
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or technology" by welfare plans. 6'
Because of these potential
distortions, the argument goes, the careless expansion of liability "will
[result in] unwarranted increases in claim costs that are ultimately
distributed to the insuring public in the form of higher insurance
premiums. 6 2 As with any question about the economic efficiency of
legal rules, the proper answer to the question of whether, and in what
fashion, existing laws regarding liability for wrongful coverage
determinations should be altered turns on complex empirical
considerations. And empirical work to date on this question is, at best,
inconclusive.63
III.

THE COMPLEXITIES OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw many proposals advanced by
prominent Democrats and Republicans to enact what is often referred to
as a Patients' Bill of Rights ("PBR")-federal legislation designed to
address the perceived regulatory vacuum created by ERISA in the
context of managed healthcare. 64 Although they differed in specifics,
61. Tennyson & Warfel, supra note 57, at 14.
62. Id. at 14. One common example used to illustrate this argument is the assertion that
expanding the remedies available for wrongful coverage decisions will cause welfare plans to
authorize expensive high-tech diagnostic procedures (e.g., MRIs) in circumstances where the plan
reasonably believes that the procedure is not medically necessary. The plan will do so, the
argument goes, because the expected cost of litigation (in light of the expansion of available
remedies) now exceeds the cost of, what the plan believes to be, an uncovered procedure. If we
believe that welfare plan fiduciaries (i) usually act in good faith and (ii) exercise judgment that is
not materially worse than that of judges and juries in making cost-benefit decisions about the
appropriateness of welfare benefits, then expanding remedies available in cases involving
allegations of wrongful coverage decisions is certainly "unwarranted." Put simply, it will drive up
healthcare costs without meaningfully improving care quality. Again, it is undeniable that one's
world view unquestionably colors his or her perspective regarding the relative integrity and
competence of welfare plan fiduciaries (on the one hand) and judges/juries (on the other hand).
Compare Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 642 (focusing on concerns with the latter), with
Bronsteen, Maher, & Stris, supra note 26, at 2311 (focusing on concerns with the former).
63. There is, of course, some literature devoted to empirical analysis of the likely effects of
changing ERISA's liability rules. See Studdert, supra note 26, at 8 (concluding that "the direct
costs of [expanded] liability are uncertain but that the prospect of litigation may have [important]
effects on coverage decision making, information exchange, risk contracting, and the extent of
employers' involvement in health coverage"); GRESENZ, supra note 16, at 4. Cf Tennyson &
Warfel, supra note 57, at 14.
64. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a FederalPatients'Billof Rights, 21 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 443 (2003). In the words of Professor Zelinsky, a fellow Symposium participant,
"For many years, ERISA Section 514 was interpreted to displace state regulation of medical care
provided via employer-sponsored plans. Since ERISA itself supplies no regulation to replace the
state regulation ERISA was believed to preempt, there appeared to be a 'regulatory gap."' Id. at
443 (citations omitted).
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many proposed reform bills expanded, in some meaningful way, the
remedies available for the wrongful handling of benefits claims by the
fiduciaries of an ERISA-governed welfare plan. 65 The differences
between these proposed bills highlight several important and challenging
issues on which consensus must be reached before the law governing
civil remedies in this area can be reformed.66
A threshold question that must be answered, of course, is whether
to permit any consequential damages as a remedy for improper handling
of a benefits claim. This question is hardly new or unique to ERISA.6 7
For years, states have grappled with the question in the process of
establishing rules of liability for the improper handling of various first
party insurance claims. 68 As explained above, the argument in favor of
permitting consequential damages is a straightforward one. In the words
of one scholar:
In first-party insurance, the cost to the policyholder of bringing suit for
breach of contract makes it possible for the insurer to deny legitimate
claims because the traditional rules governing damages award the
successful claimant only the amount to which she is entitled under the
policy. By threatening insurers who wrongfully deny claims with
liability for extracontractual damages, bad faith liability has the
69
potential to correct such underenforcement ....
Except for incumbent rent seekers, there are no commentators who
strongly advocate for maintenance of the status quo regarding civil
remedies for the improper handling of benefits claims by ERISA-

65. Studdert, supra note 26, at 8.
66. "Provisions involving judicial remedies and access to courts .. .proved to be the most
difficult to resolve during the debates in both of the chambers." Jean P. Heame & Hinda Ripps
Chaikind, Patient Protection and Managed Care: Legislation in the 107th Congress, Issue Brief for
Congress
11
(June
18,
2002),
available
at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB98017a.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of Contract by First-PartyInsurers, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 405, 409-10 (1996); Phyllis Savage, The Availability of Excess Damages for
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 164, 166 (1977).
68. "A first-party insurance contract is at its heart a promise to pay a sum or sums of money
to the insured (or heirs of the insured) when covered contingencies materialize and certain
conditions have been met." Sykes, supra note 67, at 408. "The minimum remedy for breach of
such a promise, available in all jurisdictions, is an action to recover the amounts owing under the
terms of the insurance policy. At one time courts generally held that no further remedy was
available." Id.
69. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith, 72
TEX. L. REv. 1295, 1309 (1994).
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governed welfare plans (i.e., no consequential damages regardless of
whether or not such damages were foreseeable).7 °
Once a decision has been made to permit some consequential
damages as a remedy for benefits mishandling, the next consideration is
under what circumstances to permit such damages. Again, this is hardly
new or unique to ERISA; states have long been forced to confront the
issue in establishing liability rules for the improper handling of various
first party insurance claims. And, as their experience illustrates,
resolution of the issue necessarily turns on whether one conceptualizes
the statutory violation (i.e., the benefits mishandling) as more analogous
to breach of contract or tort. 71 Division over which approach to take has
been a significant, and somewhat misunderstood, obstacle to the passage
of any federal patient protection legislation.
If a contract approach is adopted, then the accompanying liability
rules would expand the remedies available in some ERISA cases
because:
Under state [contract] law
consequential damages may be
recoverable as long as they are "foreseeable" by the party who
breaches the contract ....The foreseeability hurdle seems likely to be

a modest one where [for example, a managed care organization] has
been denied coverage for some treatment of medical importance to the

70. To be sure, there are respected commentators who stop far short of aggressively urging
reform. See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 641-42 (concluding that the argument that
existing remedies under ERISA for wrongful coverage denials are inadequate "has considerable
force and may in the end be convincing"). "[W]e cannot rule out the possibility that a broader
remedy for wrongful denial of coverage, coupled with a cap on recoverable consequential damages,
steers a reasonable course between the competing concerns." Id. at 642.
71. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-PartyInsurance Transactions
After Two Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1995) ("The tort of bad faith for breach of an
insurer's obligation in the area of first-party insurance was first recognized by a court of last resort
in 1973 in Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co. In doing so, the Supreme Court of California created
an entirely new cause of action against insurers regarding first-party coverages.") (citation omitted).
By 1995, "at least twenty-four other state courts of last resort ha[d] also recognized that an insurer
may be liable to an insured or policy beneficiary for damages beyond the contract benefits under a
tort theory ....
" Id. "Today, a majority of jurisdictions permit a tort action based solely on breach
of the implied covenant of utmost good faith (i.e., bad faith).... [In these states,] the injured party
may recover for all harm or injuries incurred, regardless of whether they could have been
anticipated." Tennyson & Warfel, supra note 57, at 3. On the other hand, "nine states confine the
good faith/bad faith inquiry to the realm of contract, but broadly define damages to include [all
damages that were] ... reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made."
Id. See also Jason C. Brown, Extra-ContractualDamages Stemming From a First-PartyInsurer's
Bad-Faith Breach: Will Minnesota Adopt the Tort or Contract Theory of Recovery?, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 525, 527 (2000) (arguing that if Minnesota courts are to follow national trends
"first-party bad-faith will become a recognized cause of action").
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72

patient.

For two reasons, such expansion would be limited. First, "insurers may
escape liability on the grounds that any economic losses were beyond
their contemplation at the time of contract formation., 73 And, second,
"damages for mental anguish [i.e., non-economic consequential
damages] are usually not recoverable in contract actions ...

On the

other hand, the accompanying liability rules would expand the remedies
available in many ERISA cases if a tort approach is adopted.75 The
extent to which remedies would be expanded would likely depend upon
the standard of culpability selected.76 And, yet again, this is hardly new
or unique to ERISA.77
Irrespective of the choice between tort and contract, numerous
additional questions must be resolved. Will recoverable damages be
limited to those that are economic or will non-economic and punitive
damages be available? 78 Would the availability of such newly permitted

72. Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 632.
73. Sykes, supra note 67, at 410.
74. Id. Although some have argued that insurance contracts fall within an exception to the
general rule, "a number ofjurisdictions have rejected that assertion or otherwise denied damages for
mental anguish on grounds of unforeseeability." Id. (citing Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980)).
75. Opponents of federal PBR legislation were (and are) well aware of this fact. See, e.g.,
John S. Hoff, Remarks at Heritage Lecture #720, The Heritage Found.: The Right Prescription?
Assessing
the
Patients'
Bill
of
Rights
(Oct.
29,
2001),
available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/HL720.cfm ("The House and Senate health care bills
are turning contract actions, which are suits over what is covered under a health care plan, into tort
cases, which have much more extended types of recovery .... This is done by letting state law
apply under some of the bills and in some circumstances. Curiously, even where federal action
would be created, they do not phrase issues of coverage in coverage terms.").
76. It is worth noting, however, that at least one scholar has argued that the standard of
culpability chosen is not particularly significant when viewing liability from a consequentialist
perspective. Abraham, supra note 69, at 1310 ("Whether first-party bad faith includes reckless or
even negligent disregard of the legitimacy of the policyholder's claim for coverage and whether the
liability insurer's duty to settle is governed by a negligence or a strict liability standard matters little,
because liability for bad faith serves a largely ex ante function.").
77. See Dominick C. Capozzola, First-PartyBad Faith: The Search for a Uniform Standard
of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181, 182 (2000) (noting that the various laws in this area are "in a
state of confusion" because even those states that do recognize the tort "apply different standards of
culpability"); see also Henderson, supra note 71, at 1156-59 (discussing the approach used in
various states); Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-PartyInsurance Transactions:
Refining the Standardof Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 26 (1992) ("Although a number of jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action...
the rationales for doing so have not been entirely consistent.").
78. Some proposed PBR legislation would have permitted economic, non-economic, and
punitive damages without limitation. See, e.g., Patient's Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 358, 106th
Cong. § 302 (1999); Patient's Bill of Rights Act of 1999, S. 6, 106th Cong. § 302 (1999); Access to
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damages be limited in any way? 79 To what extent should employers be
subject to liability for arguably making or exercising control over
coverage decisions? 80 And to what extent should key players (i.e., plans,
doctors, and employers) be prohibited from contracting around liability
rules 8through
anti-indemnification, anti-retaliation, and anti-waiver
1
rules?
Resolution of such questions requires substantial compromise
between stakeholders with strikingly different interests and ideologies.
As such, meaningful legislative reform is necessarily a complex and
difficult undertaking. By ignoring this reality and failing to reach a
thoughtful compromise, however, we ensure that an important body of
liability rules will continue to develop by default rather than by design.
IV. THE

COMPLEXITIES OF JUDICIAL RESOLUTION

As is often the case, obstacles to legislative reform have led many
to search for a judicial resolution.82 Broadly speaking, proposed judicial
resolutions address four primary subjects: the extent to which state law
is preempted by ERISA, 83 the extent to which common law remedies
may be implied under ERISA,8 4 the meaning of "appropriate equitable

Quality Care Act of 1999, H.R. 216, 106th Cong. § 302 (1999). Yet other proposed legislation
would have permitted economic damages for wrongful coverage decisions but not non-economic or
punitive damages. See, e.g., Promoting Responsible Managed Care Act of 1999, S. 374, 106th
Cong. § 302 (1999).
79. Some proposed legislation would have permitted economic, non-economic, and punitive
damages but with a safe harbor against punitive damages for coverage denials in which the plan
timely followed the recommendation of an external review panel. See, e.g., Managed Care Reform
Act of 1999, H.R. 719, 106th Cong. § 302 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Am. Benefits Council, Issue Brief, Kennedy-McCain Patients' Bill of Rights
Proposal (S. 872) Leaves Employers Vulnerable to Lawsuits (June 2001), available at
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/kennedy-mccain-s872_stmt.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 26, at 644-48.
82. To be fair, most commentators who propose judicial resolutions believe that ERISA has
been misinterpreted by the courts. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual
Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 611, 665 (1994) ("Congress
intended that the remedies provided by ERISA include . . . those available under then current state
contract law and trust law . . . [and] . . . those bodies of law . . . permitted recovery of both
consequential damages ... and punitive damages under certain circumstances .... ").
83. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The FailedJurisprudenceof Managed Care, and How to Fix
It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REv. 457, 460-61 (2003) ("ERISA, meant to
govern relationships between employers and employees, should never have been interpreted to
govern the relationships between employees and third parties .... By correcting this single error,
the Supreme Court could rationalize the law of managed care immediately.").
84. One of my fellow Symposium participants has focused on this issue. Andrew L. Oringer,
A Regulatory Vacuum Leaves Gaping Wounds-Can Common Sense Offer a Better Way to Address
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relief' in section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 85 or the availability of
consequential damages under section 502(a)(1)(B) of the statute. 6
Preemption and FederalCommon Law. For years, much has been
written about ERISA preemption, federal common law, and ways in
which existing jurisprudence should be changed.
Modest proposals
would have virtually no effect on the litigation of disputes over the
improper handling of benefits claims. And those proposals which would
significantly affect the liability rules available in such disputes--or find
new implied causes of action under ERISA-have little, if any, chance
of adoption.88
Section 502(a)(3). By far, the most commonly advanced judicial
resolutions address the meaning of the phrase "appropriate equitable
relief' in section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Clarification or reinterpretation
of the phrase is regularly urged by commentators. 89 And the United

the Pain of ERISA Preemption?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
16, on file with author) (arguing that "the development of federal common law.., by providing
appropriate causes of action where the legislature intended for ERISA to preempt state law is not
only appropriate in light of historical development, but it is called for by the legislative history.").
See also, Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 667-68
(1994) (arguing that "courts must be willing to develop [federal] common law where state law is
ousted" and that if leaving a litigant "without a remedy would contravene the purposes of ERISA, it
would follow that, upon preemption, the court should recognize a federal remedy.").
85. Another of my fellow Symposium participants has focused on this issue. Secunda, supra
note 51 (manuscript at 47) (arguing that "Section 502(a)(3) should be interpreted by future Supreme
Courts to permit traditional trust law remedies of 'make-whole' relief to rectify 'any' act or practice
that violates 'any' provisions of ERISA"). See also Langbein, supra note 17, at 1321; Medill, supra
note 17, at 831.
86. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 82, at 666 ("The impact on employee benefit plans of using the
proper rule for awarding extracontractual damages should be another tool to reduce improper plan
administrator behavior."); Muir, supra note 40, at 461 ("[Plermitting claims for foreseeable
consequential damages against plan actors who engage in opportunistic or careless behavior will
ensure that benefit plan participants and beneficiaries are compensated for injuries caused by
inappropriate benefit administration.").
87. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA's Preemption and
Saving Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(a) of ERISA's Civil
Enforcement Provisions, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 612-13 (2004); Donald T. Bogan, Protecting
Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?,
74 TuL. L. REv. 951 (2000); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Preemption,
45 CATH. U.L. REv. 1309 (1996); Seema R. Shah, Loosening ERISA 's Preemptive Grip on HMO
Medical MalpracticeClaims: A Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MINN. L. REV.
1545 (1996).
88. For example, it hardly seems possible that the Supreme Court will choose to revisit the
core holding of its unanimous 2002 decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
And it seems equally unthinkable that the Court would adopt the conception of ERISA preemption
advanced by Professor Korobkin. See Korobkin, supra note 83, at 460-61.
89. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 51 (manuscript at 5-6); Langbein, supra note 17, at 1321;
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States Department of Labor continues to aggressively pursue
clarification by filing amicus briefs with the Supreme Court and various
Courts of Appeals. 90 To be sure, there are many reasons to doubt that
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 502(a)(3) is faithful to
Congressional intent. 91
At the same time, however, there are
fundamental limits on the ability to achieve meaningful reform through
the clarification or reinterpretation of this provision.
In order for consequential damages to be available under section
502(a)(3), the interpretation of the statute advanced by the federal
government in Mertens, or some variant thereof, would need to be
adopted by the Supreme Court.
Many will object to such an
interpretation of the statute because, as a practical matter, it allows
federal judges to determine liability rules on a case-by-case basis. As
opposed to legislative reform (which might include damages caps or safe
harbors), awarding consequential damages whenever they are deemed to
be "appropriate" will, to many, be perceived as failing to balance
competing systemic concerns.92

Section 502(a)(1)(B). As explained above, federal courts have
unanimously held that ERISA does not permit the recovery of
consequential damages for the improper handling of a benefits claim.93
This interpretation of the statute can be traced back to the Supreme
Court's 1985 decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

Medill, supra note 17, at 831.
90. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of LaRue for
Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 458 F.3d 359
(4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1756); Brief of the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Coan v.
Kauffman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5173); Brief for the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Farace's Petition for Panel and En Banc Rehearing at 1, Pereira v. Farace, 413
F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 03-5035); Brief of the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Callery and Reversal of the District Court at 1, Callery v. United States Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4097).
91. Justice Ginsburg forcefully communicated this point during oral argument in Sereboff
when she asked, "Do you really think that Congress had in mind the distinction that you are now
drawing in the ring case based on 15th and 16th century English precedent?" Transcript of Oral
Argument, Sereboffv. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. 547 U.S. 356 (2005) (No. 05-260), available at

http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_260/argument/.
92. This issue is further complicated by the fact that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
apply to both pension and welfare plans. For this reason, there is no way to selectively interpret the
phrase "appropriate equitable relief." Yet it is undeniable that the calculus regarding whether (and
when) to award consequential damages is quite different in cases where the disputed benefit is a
monetary payment (a retirement, or even life insurance, benefit dispute) as opposed to those where
the disputed benefit is medical care.
93. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
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Russell.94 According to the Russell Court:
The question presented for decision [was] whether, under... (ERISA),
a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan may be held personally liable
to a plan participant or beneficiary for extracontractual compensatory
or punitive damages
caused by improper or untimely processing of
95
benefit claims.
Although the Court's holding only applied to section 502(a)(2) of
ERISA, the majority opinion contained the following dicta:
Significantly, the statutory provision explicitly authorizing a
beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights under the plan [section] 502(a)(1)(B) . . . says nothing about the recovery of
extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay
in the plan administrators' processing of a disputed claim. Thus, there
really is nothing at all in the statutory text to support the conclusion
that such a delay gives rise96 to a private right of action for
compensatory or punitive relief.
Over time, it has become settled law that none of the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA authorizes the recovery of consequential damages
97
for the improper handling of a benefits claim.
As one ERISA scholar has previously noted, the Supreme Court's
characterization of section 502(a)(1)(B) in Russell is "curious." 98 While
the Supreme Court justified its rationale in Russell as one grounded in
the language of ERISA, "the term 'extracontractual' never appears in the
statute." 99 Prior to Russell, "no reported court decision had ever used the
term in the ERISA context."' 10 0 Moreover, the Supreme Court "never
used the term before in the ERISA context" or "in any other context
either."'' 1
Nonetheless, the Russell Court relied on the phrase

94. 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985). See also Flint, supra note 82, at 621 ("The difficulty with
recovery of extracontractual damages under the benefits-due lawsuit arises because of some
disparaging Supreme Court dicta [i]n MassachusettsMutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell .
.

95. Russell, 472 U.S. at 136.
96. Id. at 144.
97. See Flint, supra note 82, at 621 (noting that, as a result of dicta in Russell, "many
subsequent courts have concluded, without examining the legislative history, that ERISA forecloses
traditional contractual remedies permitting recovery of extracontractual damages in the benefits-due
lawsuit").
98. Muir, supra note 40, at 436.
99. Id.
100. Id.at437.
101. Id.at436.
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"extracontractual damages" and, perhaps more importantly, failed to
define its scope. 10 2 This was significant because the phrase "is used in a
variety of contractual contexts to describe damage
requests that exceed
10 3
the traditional measure of contract damages."'
As explained above, the traditional measure of contract damages
permits recovery for one important category of "consequential" injuries
(i.e., those economic injuries that were foreseeable by the breaching
party at the time the contract was formed). The contrary rule (i.e., that
absolutely no consequential damages are recoverable by a victim of
contract breach) was unique to the insurance context. 10 4 But, as
explained above, that exception for insurance contracts has now been
abandoned by every state. 10 5 Thus, the Supreme Court's use of the
phrase extra-contractual damages (and the subsequent adoption by all
federal courts of an outmoded interpretation of the term) has led to a
limitation on contract damages under ERISA that is peculiar.
The Supreme Court could re-interpret section 502(a)(1)(B) to
permit the recovery of foreseeable non-economic damages that result
from the wrongful handling of a benefits claim. This is probably the
most sensible interpretation of section 502(a)(1)(B). There is nothing in
the text, legislative history, or purpose of ERISA to suggest that
Congress intended to limit the contractual remedies available under
section 502(a)(1)(B) to those available in traditional first-party insurance
06
cases.
Such reinterpretation would undoubtedly be an improvement over
102. Id. at 437 (explaining that the lack of explicit statutory language led the Russell Court to
leave its references of"extracontractual damages" undefined).
103. Id. "For example, Professor Dobbs refers to emotional distress damages and punitive
damages as extracontractual damages." Id.
104. "The most common use of the term extracontractual to refer to a limitation on damages,
however, probably occurs in the insurance context." Id. "In the past, because insurance policies
were viewed as contingent contracts to pay the amount specified under the policy, remedies
frequently were limited to the terms of the policy-generally its face value." Id. (citing Sykes,
supra note 67, at 408).
105. See Muir, supra note 40, at 437-38 ("More recently, traditional contract law principles
have been applied in the insurance context. The line drawn in contract-based causes of action is
between those 'ordinary remedies for breach [of contract],' which would include foreseeable
damages ... and those additional consequential and punitive damages traditionally recoverable in
tort but not contract.").
106. "Employee benefit claims may or may not be similar to traditional insurance actions. The
Supreme Court, though, gave no reason for its characterization of Russell's claim as one seeking
extracontractual damages and drew no parallels with traditional insurance law. Nor did it cite any
statutory provisions or legislative history analogizing employee benefit plan remedies to those
available in insurance law or otherwise justifying its choice to speak in terms of extracontractual
damages." Id. at 439.
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the status quo. As an analytical matter, this is precisely what courts
regularly do in order to permit the recovery of prejudgment interest
when benefits are wrongfully denied or delayed.10 7 There is little, if any,
principled reason to treat such interest payments as different from many
other types of consequential damages in the welfare benefit context (e.g.,
the foreseeable costs of medical bills incurred in treating a condition that
worsened because of a wrongfully denied or delayed medical
procedure).
At the same time, however, this judicial solution does not address
the three questions that largely drive the policy debate at issue: Should
recovery be permitted for consequential economic injuries which are not
foreseeable? Should recovery be permitted for non-economic injuries?
And should punitive damages be available in the most egregious cases of
benefits mishandling? As such, it is not surprising that most litigation
and commentary on this issue is directed at the interpretation of section
502(a)(3).

107. "It is fair to say that prejudgment interest appears to be a widespread, acceptable remedy
that was simply not written into ERISA, which should legitimately be included within the federal
common law of ERISA, which is contrary to the approach courts otherwise take with respect to the
remedial provisions of ERISA." ZANGLEtN & STABILE, supranote 27, at 254. Although Professors
Zanglein and Stabile characterize the awarding of prejudgment interest as an implied remedy under
federal common law, they admit that most courts have pointed to section 502(a)(3) of ERISA as
authorization for such an award. Id. As many courts have noted, it is far from clear whether a
section 502(a)(3) theory is still valid after Great-West. See, e.g., Flint v. ABB, Inc. 337 F.3d 1326,
1330-31 (11 th Cir. 2003) (leaving open the question of whether interest of delayed payments is still
available after Great-West). In my opinion, the near-universal availability of pre-judgment interest
is actually motivated by the belief of most courts that the loss of the time-value of money is a
foreseeable consequence of contract breach. See, e.g., Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers of
Am., Health and Ret. Fund of 1974, 165 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1998) (permitting pre-judgment
interest based, nominally, on the court's interpretation of section 502(a)(3) but noting that "[e]very
one who contracts to pay money on a certain day knows that, if he fails to fulfill his contract, he
must pay the established rate of interest as damages for his nonperformance. Hence it may correctly
be said that such is the implied contract of the parties." (quoting Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375,
396 (1896)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss2/6

22

